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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
At issue in this diversity action is whether plaintiff has stated a claim under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for breach of express warranty under New 
Jersey law.  The trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss, and plaintiff appeals.1  
We will affirm.2   
I. 
Richard V. D’Apuzzo, who suffers from Type 2 diabetes mellitus, filed suit 
alleging GlaxoSmithKline LLC (“GSK”) caused him economic harm by misrepresenting 
                                              
1 We exercise plenary review over a district court’s ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss.  Byers v. Intuit, Inc., 600 F.3d 286, 291 (3d Cir. 2010).  A federal court sitting in 
diversity must apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.  See Liggon-
Redding v. Estate of Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258, 262 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Erie R.R. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)).  
2 The District Court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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the safety and efficacy of its diabetes drug Avandia.3  D’Apuzzo does not allege Avandia 
harmed him physically or that he experienced any cardiovascular injury.  Instead, 
D’Apuzzo contends he would have paid less for safer, more effective insulin had GSK 
not expressly warranted Avandia to be safe and effective in treating type 2 diabetes.  
App. 25, 80. Specifically, he contends Avandia was approximately twenty-two times 
more expensive than older available drugs, such as insulin, that were often more effective 
and better tolerated than Avandia.  App. 23.  D’Apuzzo seeks damages for the higher 
cost, including co-payments, he paid for Avandia as a result of GSK’s warranty that the 
drug was safe and effective.  D’Apuzzo claims GSK breached an express warranty 
because Avandia is neither safe nor effective in treating diabetic patients like him when 
taking into account glycemic control and risk factors.  Yet D’Apuzzo does not allege that 
Avandia caused him harm or was ineffective for him.  
D’Apuzzo filed his initial class action complaint4 on July 13, 2007, and his first 
amended complaint on October 24, 2007, both in the U.S. District Court for the District 
of New Jersey.  The case was then transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania as part of MDL No. 1871 pursuant to an order from the Judicial 
                                              
3 Approved by the Food and Drug Administration on May 25, 1999, as an oral 
antidiabetic agent, Avandia is recommended and prescribed for the management of type 2 
diabetes mellitus (also referred to as non–insulin-dependent diabetes or adult-onset 
diabetes). 
4 D’Apuzzo sought to include in the class patients who were prescribed and purchased 
Avandia (rosiglitazone maleate) and two related pharmaceuticals manufactured by 
GSK—Avandamet (a combination of rosiglitazone maleate and metformin) and 
Avandaryl (a combination of rosiglitazone maleate and glimepiride)—in New Jersey after 




Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.5  On June 6, 2010, D’Apuzzo filed his second amended 
complaint, alleging violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act and unjust 
enrichment.  On September 7, 2011, on GSK’s motion, the District Court dismissed 
D’Apuzzo’s second amended complaint without prejudice.  On October 25, 2011, 
D’Apuzzo filed his third amended complaint, alleging violations of the New Jersey 
Consumer Fraud Act, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, fraud, 
negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and unjust enrichment.  GSK moved to dismiss 
the third amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). 
On October 15, 2013,6 the District Court granted GSK’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss the entire complaint with prejudice, concluding it would be inequitable to permit 
D’Apuzzo a fourth opportunity to state a claim.  The District Court dismissed all but one 
of D’Apuzzo’s claims—for violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, breach of 
implied warranty, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and unjust 
enrichment—as barred by the New Jersey Products Liability Act (“PLA”), N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 2A:58C-1 et seq., which is the exclusive basis for any New Jersey products liability 
                                              
5 D’Apuzzo’s case is one of approximately 4,900 Avandia lawsuits centralized in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under MDL No. 
1871.  In centralizing these suits, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation noted the 
actions “arise from allegations that certain diabetes drugs manufactured by GSK—
Avandia and/or two sister drugs containing Avandia (Avandamet and Avandaryl)—cause 
an increased risk of heart attack and other physical injury, and that GSK failed to provide 
adequate warnings concerning that risk.”  In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices and 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 528 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1340–41 (J.P.M.L. 2007).  As noted, 
D’Apuzzo does not allege he suffered physical injury as a result of taking Avandia. 
6 On July 10, 2013, the District Court issued a memorandum opinion and order 
dismissing D’Apuzzo’s complaint.  It vacated that order on July 24, 2013, and issued a 
revised memorandum opinion and order dismissing the case on October 15, 2013. 
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action, except for express warranty and environmental tort actions.7  App. 3-4.  
D’Apuzzo does not appeal the dismissal of those claims.8   
The District Court also dismissed D’Apuzzo’s express warranty claim—which is 
explicitly exempt from the ambit of the PLA—for failure to allege the “exact text of the 
warranties, or the precise time periods these warranties were in effect.”  App. 5.  
D’Apuzzo filed this timely appeal, in which the only ruling he challenges is the dismissal 
of his express warranty claim.  
D’Apuzzo contends GSK “expressly warranted on its labels and packaging to 
Plaintiffs, prescribers, and patients, that Avandia would provide assist [sic] ‘in the 
                                              
7 The PLA defines a “product liability action” as “any claim or action brought by a 
claimant for harm caused by a product, irrespective of the theory underlying the claim, 
except actions for harm caused by breach of an express warranty.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2A:58C-1(b)(3).  The PLA “is both expansive and inclusive, encompassing virtually all 
possible causes of action relating to harms caused by consumer and other products.”  In 
re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 503 (N.J. 2007).  A plaintiff cannot circumvent the 
PLA by asserting other causes of action stemming from harm caused by a product if 
those causes of action are not excluded from the PLA’s ambit.  See, e.g., Repola v. 
Morbark Indus., Inc., 934 F.2d 483, 492 (3d Cir. 1991) (“We . . . predict that the New 
Jersey Supreme Court would hold that the [PLA] generally subsumes common law 
product liability claims, thus establishing itself as the sole basis of relief under New 
Jersey law available to consumers injured by a defective product.”); Arlandson v. Hartz 
Mountain Corp., 792 F. Supp. 2d 691, 702–04 (D.N.J. 2011); Sinclair v. Merck & Co., 
948 A.2d 587, 595–96 (N.J. 2008); Bailey v. Wyeth, Inc., 37 A.3d 549, 582–84 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 2008), aff’d sub nom. DeBoard v. Wyeth, Inc., 28 A.3d 1245 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011). 
8 The PLA requires a plaintiff to have suffered (a) physical damage to property (other 
than to the product itself), (b) personal physical injury, (c) pain and suffering or 
emotional harm, or (d) any loss of consortium or services deriving from these types of 
harm.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-1(b)(2).  As noted, D’Apuzzo only alleges he suffered 
economic loss—the amount of money he paid for Avandia, including insurance co-
payments—and does not allege he suffered any physical injury.  See Sinclair, 948 A.2d at 




management of type 2 diabetes mellitus’ in a safe and efficacious manner.”9  App. 80.  
But D’Apuzzo does not allege GSK made unqualified or absolute guarantees of 
Avandia’s safety and efficacy.  Nor could he make such an allegation given that the 
“express warranty” contained in Avandia’s “labels and packaging” consists of much 
more than “safe and effective.”  The Avandia label discloses contraindications, risk 
factors, and potential side effects of taking the drug, thereby warning it may not be safe 
under all circumstances for every person.  The Avandia label in effect when D’Apuzzo 
started taking the drug in October 2002 warned, among other things, that (1) Avandia 
could exacerbate congestive heart failure, (2) patients at risk for heart failure should be 
monitored, and (3) Avandia was contraindicated for patients with New York Heart 
Association Class III and IV cardiac status.10  The label was revised in 2003 to more 
prominently feature the cardiac side effects warning and to include data from clinical 
studies indicating that Avandia could increase the risk of cardiovascular events.11  GSK 
later added to the label a black box warning of the risk of congestive heart failure and 
myocardial infarction (heart attack).12  Even with these potential side effects, Avandia 
                                              
9 D’Apuzzo’s factual allegations are taken from his third amended complaint.   
10 See Avandia Approval History, NDA 021071, Apr. 3, 2000, Label, FDA, 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2000/21-071S001_Avandia_prntlbl. 
pdf. 
11 See Avandia Approval History, NDA 021071, Feb. 27, 2003, Label, FDA, http://www. 
accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2003/021071s004lbl.pdf. 
12 See Avandia Approval History, NDA 021071, Aug. 14, 2007, Feb. 3, 2011, Labels, 
FDA, www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2007/021071s028lbl.pdf (Aug. 14, 
2007, label), www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2011/021071s038, 
021410s026,021700s010lbl.pdf (Feb. 3, 2011, label). 
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remains on the market today.13  
II. 
A. 
 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we assume plaintiff’s well-
pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations to be true.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662, 678–79 (2009). D’Apuzzo contends he adequately pleaded his express warranty 
claim because (1) New Jersey law does not require the use of particular language for the 
creation of an express warranty and (2) his third amended complaint referenced general 
representations of safety and efficacy contained in Avandia’s labeling and package 
inserts as the source of the express warranty.  The District Court disagreed, concluding 
that D’Apuzzo’s failure “to allege the exact text of the warranties, or the precise time 
periods these warranties were in effect” was fatal to his express warranty claim.  App. 5.  
We agree with the District Court that D’Apuzzo’s allegations were general and vague.  
But we need not decide whether D’Apuzzo was required to provide the exact text and 
time period of the warranties because we can decide this case on another ground—
D’Apuzzo’s failure to state an express warranty claim as a matter of New Jersey law.  See 
Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011) (“We may affirm a district court 
for any reason supported by the record.”).  Our decision turns not on the federal pleading 
standard and whether D’Apuzzo adequately pleaded the content of the express warranty 
he alleged, but instead on whether the language of GSK’s label creates an express 
                                              
13 See Drug Details—Avandia, FDA, www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/ 




warranty under New Jersey law.14  Because we conclude the statement that Avandia is 
“safe and effective” for its intended use contained on its label disclosing 
contraindications, risk factors, and potential side effects of the drug is not sufficient as a 
matter of law to state a New Jersey express warranty claim, we will affirm. 
B. 
D’Apuzzo must state a valid express warranty claim as a matter of New Jersey 
substantive law to avoid dismissal.15  In order to state a claim for breach of express 
warranty under New Jersey law, plaintiff must allege (1) GSK made an affirmation of 
fact, promise, or description about the product; (2) this affirmation of fact, promise, or 
description became part of the basis of the bargain for the product; and (3) the product 
ultimately did not conform to the affirmation of fact, promise, or description.  See N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 12A:2-313.  Under New Jersey law, “guarantees of future performance 
should be specific.”  See Herbstman v. Eastman Kodak Co., 342 A.2d 181, 187 (N.J. 
1975).  To create an express warranty, the seller need not use formal words such as 
“warrant” or “guarantee” or have a specific intention to make a warranty.  N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 12A:2-313.  But that does not mean D’Apuzzo is relieved from identifying the 
affirmation of fact, promise, or description he contends constitutes the express warranty 
                                              
14 Because D’Apuzzo’s complaint explicitly refers to Avandia’s “labels” and those 
documents are publicly available on the FDA’s website, we may take judicial notice of 
the labels’ content.  S. Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Grp. Ltd., 
181 F.3d 410, 426–27 (3d Cir. 1999); see also, e.g., Pryor v. NCAA, 288 F.3d 548, 559–
60 (3d Cir. 2002).  We do so here not in the ordinary course but because, for the reasons 
described below, D’Apuzzo’s express warranty claim cannot proceed under New Jersey 
substantive law regardless of how it is pleaded. 
15 Following oral argument, plaintiff requested we certify the question to the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey.  We denied the motion. 
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under New Jersey law. Id. 
For the first time on appeal—but in none of his complaints—D’Apuzzo focuses on 
one statement from a 2007 Avandia label that he alleges created an express warranty:  
“The 8 mg daily dose has been shown to be safe and effective in clinical studies as 
monothereapy [sic] and in combination with metformin, sulfonylurea, or sulfonylurea 
plus metformin.”16 Appellant Br. 21.17   
This statement asserts only that a particular dose of Avandia has been shown to be 
safe and effective in clinical studies.18  FDA regulations required GSK to disclose the 
highest dose for which the safety and efficacy of Avandia had been established in clinical 
trials.  See 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(3)(i)(B) (noting prescription drug labeling must identify 
an upper limit dose beyond which the safety and effectiveness of the drug have not been 
                                              
16 Two cases on which D’Apuzzo relies serve only to highlight his failure to identify with 
specificity the affirmation of fact, promise, or description he contends is the express 
warranty.  See Stewart v. Smart Balance, Inc., No. 11-6174, 2012 WL 4168584, at *11–
12 (D.N.J. June 26, 2012) (refusing to dismiss breach of express warranty claim alleging 
defendants sold milk labeled “fat free” that failed to meet federal regulations for fat-free 
milk); In re Ford Motor Co. E-350 Van Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. II), No. 03-4558, 2008 
WL 4126264, at *3–5 (D.N.J. Sept. 2, 2008) (refusing to dismiss breach of express 
warranty claim alleging Ford marketed vans as “15-passenger” that could not safely 
transport 15 passengers).  Unlike D’Apuzzo’s general allegations against GSK, plaintiffs 
in these cases pointed to specific affirmations of fact or descriptions—“fat free” and “15-
passenger”—that they alleged constituted express warranties. 
17 Typically, D’Apuzzo’s citation to this passage for the first time in his appellate brief 
would be improper and we would decline to consider it.  See United States ex rel. Wilkins 
v. United Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 303 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[O]rdinarily a court of 
appeals should not take judicial notice of documents on an appeal which were available 
before the district court decided the case but nevertheless were not tendered to that 
court.”).  But in this case we will consider the passage because it comes from a 2007 
Avandia label of which we have taken judicial notice. 
18 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to specify the particular dose of Avandia he took. 
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established or increased doses do not result in increased effectiveness).19  And the 
statement D’Apuzzo cites, when considered alone, does not claim Avandia will be safe 
and effective in every case for every consumer.      
Nor could it be read to make that claim when considering the entirety of the 
Avandia label.  See Gladden v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 416 A.2d 
394, 397 (N.J. 1980) (determining whether an express warranty was created by 
evaluating an owner’s guide and guarantee document in its entirety).  Crucially, 
Avandia’s labeling discloses contraindications, risk factors, and possible side effects of 
the drug, thereby indicating the drug might prove dangerous or ineffective for some 
people.  The August 14, 2007 Avandia label discloses, among other things, that Avandia 
is contraindicated for patients with New York Heart Association Class III or IV heart 
failure, may increase the risk of cardiac failure or other cardiac effects, should be used 
with caution in patients with edema, may increase the risk of hypoglycemia, may cause 
weight gain, may increase the risk of bone fractures in women, and may increase the risk 
of pregnancy.  See Avandia Approval History, NDA 021071, Aug. 14, 2007, Label, FDA, 
www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2007/021071s028lbl.pdf. These 
contraindications, risk factors, and possible side effects are the primary reasons 
D’Apuzzo required a prescription to obtain Avandia.  Because GSK disclosed Avandia’s 
contraindications, risk factors, and possible side effects on the drug’s label, the statement 
                                              
19 The FDA regulates the approval and labeling of new drugs.  As part of the approval 
process, the FDA evaluates a new drug’s safety and effectiveness as well as its proposed 
labeling.  See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2470–71 (2013); see also 21 
U.S.C. § 355; 21 C.F.R. § 201.5. 
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on that same label that the 8 mg dose of Avandia has been shown in clinical trials to be 
“safe and effective” for its intended use cannot be read as an unqualified guarantee that 
Avandia would be safe and effective for all consumers.   
No New Jersey authority directly addresses the question of whether the statement 
that Avandia is “safe and effective” for its intended use—contained on a label disclosing 
contraindications, risk factors, and potential side effects—is sufficient to create an 
express warranty under New Jersey law.  Accordingly, we interpret New Jersey law as 
we predict it would be interpreted by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.  See Travelers 
Indem. Co. v. Dammann & Co., 594 F.3d 238, 244 (3d Cir. 2010).  “In making such a 
prediction, we . . . consider relevant state precedents, analogous decisions, considered 
dicta, scholarly works, and any other reliable data tending convincingly to show how the 
highest court in the state would resolve the issue at hand.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted).   
New Jersey’s express warranty statute follows section 2-313 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code.  Compare N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:2-313, with U.C.C. § 2-313. 
Connecticut’s and Ohio’s express warranty statutes also follow section 2-313,20 and  
courts interpreting the law of these states have refused to find the words “safe and 
effective” to create an express warranty in the absence of representations that a drug was 
free from all harmful side effects or was absolutely harmless.  See Basko v. Sterling 
Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 428 (2d Cir. 1969) (“[W]e need say only that defendant did not 
represent either (1) that its drugs were free from all harmful side effects or (2) that its 
                                              
20 See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 42a-2-313; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1302.26.  
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drugs were absolutely harmless.”); Fraser v. Wyeth, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 2d 244, 257–58 
(D. Conn. 2012) (“[A] drug manufacturer’s representation in advertising or a warning 
label that a product is safe and effective, or an advertisement or warning label that does 
not adequately highlight a particular known or knowable risk does not create an express 
warranty in the absence of a guarantee that the particular product is free from all harmful 
side effects.”); In re Meridia Prods. Liab. Litig., 328 F. Supp. 2d 791, 818 (N.D. Ohio 
2004) (finding under Ohio law that “asserting that a product is ‘safe and effective’ is not 
sufficiently clear to create an express warranty”).  These authorities are consistent with 
the well-established principle that “safe and effective” are relative terms in the 
pharmaceutical industry—“safe” drugs harm some people and “effective” drugs do not 
work in every case.  See Bailey v. Wyeth, Inc., 37 A.3d 549, 554 n.8 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div. 2008) (noting the FDA concedes “no drug is absolutely safe [and] all drugs have 
side effects” and defines “safe” to mean “the benefits of the drug appear to outweigh the 
risks” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 21 C.F.R. § 201.57 (noting effective means 
there is substantial evidence of the drug’s effectiveness based on adequate, well-
controlled clinical studies).21  
                                              
21 These cases should not be read as foreclosing express warranty claims against 
pharmaceutical manufacturers or retailers.  In certain circumstances, courts have found 
express warranties with respect to drug safety.  See Rite Aid Corp. v. Levy-Gray, 894 
A.2d 563, 570–72 (Md. 2006) (concluding a package insert instructing patients to “[t]ake 
with food or milk if stomach upset occurs” could constitute an express warranty and 
noting that Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, “do[es] not support the 
proposition that there can never be an express warranty with respect to prescription 
drugs”); Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 79 Cal. Rptr. 369, 377–78 (Dist. Ct. App. 
1969) (finding that a package insert indicating that “‘[t]here are no known 
contraindications to oral polio virus vaccines” was an affirmation of fact that constituted 
an express warranty). 
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Our decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 574–76 (3d Cir. 
1990), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 505 U.S. 504 (1992), is consistent 
with these cases interpreting Connecticut and Ohio law.  In Cipollone, the plaintiff cited 
specific representations made in Chesterfield cigarette advertisements.  One 
advertisement stated, without qualification, that “NOSE, THROAT, and Accessory 
Organs [are] not Adversely Affected by Smoking Chesterfields.”  Id. at 575.  Another 
advertisement cited a study that purportedly showed “proof” that Chesterfield cigarettes 
“never . . . did you any harm.”  Id.  Other advertisements suggested consumers should 
“PLAY SAFE” and “Smoke Chesterfield” and described cigarettes as “just what the 
doctor ordered.”  Id.  We concluded that under New Jersey law a “reasonable jury could 
infer that an unqualified representation that smoking is safe creates a warranty that 
smoking for a long period of time is safe.”  Id. at 576.  Unlike the plaintiff in Cipollone, 
D’Apuzzo does not allege GSK made unqualified promises or affirmations of fact 
regarding Avandia. 
Marko v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 94 A.2d 348 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1953), 
similarly involved absolute assurances of safety.  In that case, the plaintiff was injured 
when a lawnmower kept operating upon striking a rock despite a salesman’s assurances 
the mower was “absolutely safe” and would stop operation upon contacting an obstacle.  
Id. at 349.  The court found plaintiff made out a breach of express warranty claim 
because “[u]nder the warranty in question . . . plaintiff had a right to expect that when the 
mower struck the rock the blade would stop revolving and the machine would stop 
operating.”  Id. at 350.  Unlike in Marko, D’Apuzzo has not alleged GSK promised 
14 
 
Avandia would be safe for all consumers, and GSK’s disclosure of Avandia’s 
contraindications, risk factors, and potential side effects on the drug’s label indicates 
GSK did not make such an unqualified guarantee. 
Although some courts have permitted express warranty claims based on the 
representation that a drug or medical device was safe and effective, these cases involved 
more substantial representations than those at issue here.  See, e.g., Knipe v. SmithKline 
Beecham, 583 F. Supp. 2d 602, 625–26 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (refusing to dismiss express 
warranty claim on summary judgment where plaintiff alleged manufacturer represented 
the drug to be safe and effective in “various articles, conferences, and journals presented 
to the medical community” and had made specific statements regarding the drug’s safety 
and efficacy in a particular group); Simonet v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 506 F. Supp. 
2d 77, 88–89 (D.P.R. 2007) (refusing to grant motion to dismiss where plaintiff alleged 
manufacturer made representations regarding its tablets’ dissolution rate and controlled-
release effect in numerous sources but defects in the tablets caused them not to function 
as described); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 207–08 (Colo. 1984) (finding a 
jury could reasonably have concluded that manufacturer’s representations regarding a 
medical device—including that it could “prevent pregnancy without producing any 
general effects on the body, blood or brain”—could constitute an express warranty).  By 
contrast, D’Apuzzo alleges only that GSK represented Avandia as “safe and efficacious” 
in one source—Avandia’s “labels and packaging”—and on appeal points to only one 
qualified statement on the label.  See In re Meridia Prods. Liab. Litig., 328 F. Supp. 2d at 
818 (determining under Ohio law that a manufacturer’s representation of a drug as “safe 
15 
 
and effective”—without more substantial factual allegations by plaintiffs—did not 
constitute an express warranty). 
Because GSK disclosed Avandia’s contraindications, risk factors, and potential 
side effects and D’Apuzzo does not allege GSK made unqualified guarantees of safety or 
effectiveness, D’Apuzzo has failed as a matter of New Jersey law to state an express 
warranty claim.   
C. 
At oral argument, D’Apuzzo contended GSK also breached the alleged express 
warranty because the company failed to disclose or understated known cardiac risks that 
rendered Avandia potentially dangerous to consumers.  This argument is unavailing 
because it is an attempt to argue a failure to warn cause of action in an express warranty 
appeal.   
Failure to warn and express warranty are different causes of action.  See, e.g., 
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524–25 (analyzing failure to warn and express warranty claims as 
separate causes of action).  A failure to warn claim is a type of product liability action 
governed by the New Jersey Products Liability Act.  See Cornett v. Johnson & Johnson, 
48 A.3d 1041, 1055 (N.J. 2012) (noting the PLA defines an adequate product warning as 
“one that a reasonably prudent person in the same or similar circumstances would have 
provided with respect to the danger and that communicates adequate information on the 
dangers and safe use of the product” (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
But D’Apuzzo’s appeal is based on express warranty, which is specifically 
excluded from the scope of the PLA because it is not a product liability cause of action.  
16 
 
See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-1b(3) (“‘Product liability action’ means any claim or action 
brought by a claimant for harm caused by a product, irrespective of the theory underlying 
the claim, except actions for harm caused by breach of an express warranty.”).  
D’Apuzzo never raised a failure to warn claim, and he cannot raise that claim for the first 
time in this appeal of the dismissal of his express warranty cause of action.  See, e.g., 
Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 2013) (“We 
generally refuse to consider issues that the parties have not raised below.”).  
Accordingly, we reject D’Apuzzo’s attempt to advance a failure to warn cause of 
action in this express warranty appeal. 
III. 
Because D’Apuzzo has not stated a claim for breach of express warranty under 
New Jersey law, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of D’Apuzzo’s express 
warranty claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 
